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OTS VS THE BAR:
MUST ATTORNEYS ADVISE
DIRECTORS THAT THE




[Tihe average American was terrorized by thugs whose weapons were
pens, not guns; whose attire was a suit, not a ski mask; and whose place
of attack was a boardroom, not a back alley. While no pistol was pointed
at their heads, the American people got mugged anyway. The one thing
the street crook and the S&L criminal have in common is their goal: The
public's money. Over the past decade, the taxpayer has been robbed of
billions in the most pervasive financial swindle in our times.'
This quotation from Congressman Schumer captures the sentiments
of many critics who believe that white-collar criminals in the savings and
loan industry bilked the American taxpayer in the largest heist in our na-
tion's history.2 The attack on the white-collar thugs in pinstripes does not
*Assistant Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law. I would like to thank
the Texas Tech University Law School Foundation for their generous research support.
1136 CONG. REC. H6003 (daily ed. July 31, 1990) (statement of Rep. Schumer).
2Despite the fact that many legal commentators have recognized that other fac-
tors contributed to the savings and loan crisis, most commentators dwell on the
fraudulent, abusive practices of those who controlled institutions. Compare LAWRENCE
J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE, PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK AND THRIFT REGULA-
TION (1991) (arguing that the majority of thrifts failed because of an amalgam of prob-
lems including deregulation, poor management and deteriorating real estate markets)
with MARTIN MAYER, THE GREATEST-EVER BANK ROBBERY: THE COLLAPSE OF THE SAV-
INGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY (1990) (discussing the crisis in terms of a swindle perpetrated
ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW / 1993
stop with an indictment of the corporate insiders, but extends in many cases
to the lawyers who performed services for the financial institutions. 3 In the
eyes of some critics, those attorneys should now bear some responsibility
fojr the losses incurred in connection with the bank and thrift crisis.
In an attempt to recover billions lost by the government in connection
with the bank and thrift crisis, government regulators have proceeded with
a sense of mission.4 Nationwide, these regulators have launched an attack
against former officers and directors of the financial institutions. They have
also embarked on a crusade against the professionals who represented the
institutions.
In 1990, the government received a symbolic boost from an opinion
of United States District Court Judge Stanley Sporkin in which he upheld
the thrift regulators' 1989 seizure of the Lincoln Savings and Loan Associa-
tion ("Lincoln").5 In oft-quoted dicta, Judge Sporkin offered scathing
criticism of the professionals who represented Lincoln. Noting that not
enough scrutiny had been focused on the private sector, Judge Sporkin asked
the following questions:
Where were these professionals, a number of whom are now asserting
their rights under the Fifth Amendment, when these dearly improper
transactions were being consummated?
by a "community of villians"). For the bank regulator's view, see OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANK FAILURE: AN EVALUATION OF THE FACTORS
CONTRIBUTING TO THE FAILURE OF NATIONAL BANKS (1988). The National Commis-
sion on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement, a Congressional
panel established by the Crime Control Act of 1990, will be investigating the causes
of the savings and loan crisis, including the role of the private sector. S&L Investigative
Commirion Talks About Causes of S&L Crisis, Elects Co-Chairman, 58 Banking Rep. (BNA)
830 (May 11, 1992).
3"Financial institution" can refer to an array of entities including banks, savings
and loans associations, credit unions, and insurance companies. This Article uses
"financial institutions" to refer to banks and thrifts whose deposits are insured by
the U.S. government. "Insured depository institution" is the technical statutory
reference. 12 U.S.C. S 1813(c)(2) (Supp. 111990). "Bank counsel" refers to attorneys
who represent financial institutions.
4See Paul W Grace, Wy FSLIC Sues, Outlook of the Federal Home Loan Bank System
(Sept./Oct. 1987) (noting that it was the government's "responsibility to proceed with
a sense of mission") appended to Civil Enforcement Investigations of Failing Thnfts and Claims
Against Directors, Officr and Third Parties, at Attachment I (PLI Commercial Law & Prac-
tice Course Handbook Series No. 466, 1988). Paul Grace served as former Associate
General Counsel and Director of Litigation at the former Federal Home Loan Bank
Board.
5Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990).
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Why didn't any of them speak up or disassociate themselves from the
transactions?
Where also were the outside accountants and attorneys when these tran-
sactions were effectuated?6
At a press briefing following Judge Sporkin's opinion, Timothy Ryan,
Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS"), stated that the rul-
ing would give the OTS "powerful ammunition" to launch a major round
of enforcement actions against lawyers, accountants and other professionals
involved in thrift failures.7 Referring to Judge Sporkin's opinion, Harris
Weinstein, Chief Counsel of the OTS, echoed Mr. Ryan's comments, stating,
"The court recognized that depositors are investors in a financial institu-
tion and must be protected by the board of directors and the professionals
[and that] the federal government, as the insurer of the deposits, stands
in the shoes of depositors."
8
In 1992, the government's campaign reached a crescendo when the OTS
filed an action against the prestigious New York-based law firm of Kaye,
Scholer, Fierman, Hayes and Handler ("Kaye Scholer"). The OTS, in an
unprecedented move, sued Kaye Scholer for $275 million and moved to
freeze the firm's assets. 9 In an eighty-three page Notice of Charges, the
OTS and the Justice Department claimed that Kaye Scholer attorneys had
participated in regulatory violations in the course of the firm's representa-
tion of the now-defunct Lincoln and Lincoln's parent, American Continental
Corporation. 10 Within days, the firm settled for $41 million.11
These lawsuits, coupled with various policy statements by Harris Weins-
tein, have both alarmed the bar and ignited a controversy over the proper
role of bank counsel. The American Bar Association ("ABA") established
a task force in 1990 to study the liability of attorneys representing depository
6 d. at 920.
71n the press briefing on August 24, 1990, Ryan also stated that Judge Sporkin's
ruling "clearly and definitively" reflected the CTS's view that professionals cooperated
with Lincoln's management and "that view 'will be reflected soon in [the OTS's] en-
forcement actions' regarding professionals involved with other failed thrifts." See OTS
Sees Keating Ruling as Ammuitionfor Major Round Enforcement Actions, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA)
399-400 (Sept. 10, 1990) (suggesting that the decision would be a "blueprint" for OTS
actions against attorneys).
81d. at 400.
90TS Freezes Kaye, Scholer's Assets, Asks for $275 Million in Restitution, 58 Banking Rep.
(BNA) 419 (Mar. 9, 1992) [hereinafter OTS Freezes].
I0 d.
"Kaye, Scholer admitted no wrongdoing. Lincoln Savings & Loan, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 28, 1992, at 9.
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institutions.12 Since that time, attorneys from the public and private sec-
tors have debated the issues raised by the government's enforcement ac-
tivity and policy statements.' 3
. Public debate focused on Weinstein's early speeches which were inter-
preted as suggesting that attorneys have a fiduciary duty to the depository
fund. Following the outcry of the private bar, Weinstein clarified his argu-
ment, asserting that bank attorneys have a duty to advise the bank direc-
tors that the directors have a duty to both depositors and the depository fund.
Part II of this paper discusses the first OTS actions against attorneys.1 4
Part III generally discusses this emerging theory of liability based on
counsel's duty to advise directors on their duties to depositors and the
depository fund.i5 In Part IV, a comparison of the experience of the securities
bar to that of the banking bar demonstrates how the government's enforce-
ment activity has already changed attorneys' perceptions of their role and
their approach to law practice.16 Finally, Part V considers questions related
to the proper role of counsel.'
7
II. OTS ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AGAINST ATTORNEYS
The CTS has used the enhanced enforcement tools granted to regulators
under the Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
12ABA Task Force Studies Liability of Counsd for Depository Institutions, 55 Banking Rep.
(BNA) 755 (Nov. 5, 1990). In response to concerns arising out of the Kaye Scholer
case, the ABA also formed the Working Group on Lawyers' Representation of Regulated
Clients. See ABA, OS Square Off on Lawyer Liability in Moves Toward Debate, Possible Battle,
59 Banking Rep. (BNA) 266 (Aug. 24, 1992).
'3The April 11, 1991, meeting of the American Bar Association Section of Business
Law discussed the liability of attorneys who represent financial institutions. Ohio, Loui-
siana Draft Bills Would Limit Liability of Bank and Thrift Attorneys, 56 Banking Rep. (BNA)
765 (Apr. 22, 1991). In addition, on March 21, 1991, the Administrative Conference
of the United States held a colloquy on the "Ethical Obligations of Attorneys Represen-
ting Depository Institutions." ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
1991 ANNUAL REPORT 22 (1992).
"'See infra notes 18-40 and accompanying text.
15See infra notes 41-97 and accompanying text.
16e infra notes 98-125 and accompanying text.
17See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
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of 1989 ("FIRREA") 8 by filing administrative actions against institution-
affiliated parties, 19 including attorneys and accountants. In its first move
against an institution-affiliated person, the OTS filed an action against
Coopers & Lybrand, the former accounting firm of Silverado Banking and
Loan Association ("Silverado").20
The OTS action against Silverado's counsel, the Denver law firm of
Sherman & Howard followed OTS's actions against Silverado's accoun-
tants.21 On June 18, 1991, the OTS announced that it had reached an agree-
ment in which Sherman & Howard agreed to a cease and desist order.
22
Among other things, the firm agreed to comply with conditions that govern-
ed its representation of federally insured thrifts, including provisions to
avoid conflicts of interest. 2 The firm also agreed to advise an institution's
directors and officers to address safety and soundness issues concerning
the institution's operations, as well as to seek advice from the OTS when
needed to assure compliance with federal laws.
24
On June 18, 1991, the OTS also announced that it had reached a set-
tlement of its administrative action against the Mississippi law firm of In-
gram, Matthews & Stroud ("Ingram"). 25 Ingram and its attorneys agreed
"8Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
19Attorneys and accountants were explicitly made subject to regulatory liability
by the FIRREA definition of institution-affiliated parties, which included the follow-
ing category of persons: "any independent contractor (including any attorney, appraiser,
or accountant) who knowingly or recklessly participates in (A) any violation of any
law or regulation; (B) any breach of fiduciary duty; or (C) any unsafe or unsound
practice, which caused or is likely to cause more than a minimal financial loss to, or
a significant adverse effect on, the insured depository institution." 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u)(4)
(Supp. 11 1990) (defining institution-affiliated parties for insured depository institu-
tion). See John C. Murphy, Jr. & Linda S. Matlack, Sanzfiwant Provisions Redad to Institution-
Affiliated Parties, in CIVIL & CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS, DIRECTORS AND PRO-
FESSIONALS: BANK AND THRIFT LITIGATION IN THE 1990s, at 11 (PLI Commercial Law
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. 595, 1991) (for a thorough discussion of issues
related to the liability of counsel and other professionals).
2 00n December 12, 1990, Coopers & Lybrand agreed to a cease and desist order
that implemented a number of auditing procedures. See Coopers & Lybrand Enters C&D
Order with OTS over Silverado Audit Charges, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 991 (Dec. 17, 1990).
2 OTS Sette with Silverado Law Firm, Reaches Separate Agreement on C&D Order, 57 Banking
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to sign a consent order, which included provisions for payment of civil
penalties and restitution.
26
In response to the settlements with Ingram and Sherman & Howard,
Kenneth Guido, Jr., OTS Deputy Chief Counsel for Special Projects, stated
that the most important message of the agreements was that both firms
recognized the OTS's jurisdiction over thrift counsel practice." Guido also
stated that the CTS can regulate thrift counsel as persons who practice before
the agency and as persons who participate in the conduct of the affairs of
the institution.
28
On March 2, 1992, the OTS used its statutory authority to bring an
administrative action against Kaye Scholer.29 In this action, the OTS focused
on the statutory liability of the firm and its attorneys as institution-affiliated
parties, as defined in FIRREA, and as persons participating in the "con-
duct of the affairs of [the] institution" as defined in former Federal Home
Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB") regulations.
3 0
Among other claims, the OTS alleged that the firm acted as Lincoln's
agent in the FHLBB's examination and that the attorneys omitted material
facts from, and made misrepresentations in submissions to the FHLBB.3 1
The OTS asserted that these allegedly false and misleading statements and
omissions violated the FHLBB regulation which prohibited "persons par-
ticipating in the conduct of the affairs of [the] institution" from making
any false or misleading statements to the FHLBB.
3 2
As a consequence of this alleged conduct, the government claimed that
it incurred actual losses of at least $275 million. 3 The OTS sought reim-
bursement from Kaye Scholer for these losses. The government also sought
26Id. See also OTS Considrring Policy on Requesting Information from Outside S&L Counsel,
57 Banking Rep. (BNA) 305, 306 (Aug. 19, 1991) (describing the alleged professional
misconduct of Ingram in connection with its representation of First Guaranty Bank
for Savings).
2h77zft Lawyers Can Be Regulated by OTS, Senior Agency Offwial Says, 56 Banking Rep.
(BNA) 1202-03 (June 24, 1991).
2 Id. at 1203.
290TS Freezes, supra note 9, at 419.
"Section 563.18(b) of the FHLBB Regulations, formerly 12 C.F.R. S 563.18(b)
(1986).
31Notices of Charges Filed in the Administrative Proceeding of In re Fishbein, (Xf'S
AP-92-19 (Mar. 1, 1992) [hereinafter Notice of Charges].
3This prohibition was set forth in 563.18(b)(2) of the FHLBB regulations, formerly
12 C.F.R. S 563.18(b)(2) (1986).
33See Notice of Charges, supra note 31, at 79.
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to bar Kaye Scholer from representing federally insured depository institu-
tions. 34 Six days after the OTS filed these charges and issued the temporary
cease and desist order "freezing assets," Kaye Scholer and its attorneys
reached a settlement with the OTS.35 The firm agreed to pay $41 million.
36
In the Kaye Scholer action, the OTS used FIRREA provisions to ex-
pand remedies for conduct that occurred prior to the enactment of FIRREA.
The pre-FIRREA banking law statutes relating to restitution and civil
penalties authorized such sanctions against "persons participating in the
conduct of the affairs ' 37 of the institutions. 38 Because Kaye Scholer and
the other law firms settled, the authority of the OTS to use the FIRREA
provisions against outside counsel for pre-FIRREA conduct has not yet
been tested. 39 Therefore, the extent to which attorneys are liable for pre-
FIRREA violations will not be determined until there is a contested en-
forcement action.
40
3 4Under 12 C.F.R. § 513.4(a) (1992) the oTS has the authority to disbar any per-
son from practicing before the OTS.
35Director of Office of Thrift Supervision Press Release (Mar. 8, 1992) (available
from the Office of Thrift Supervision Information Services Division). The OTS's pre-
judgment attachment triggered a great deal of national publicity in both popular and
legal newspapers. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., What Constitution Says on Freeze Orders,
NAT'L L.J., June 8, 1992, at 18 (questioning the constitutionality of the exparte freeze
order); John C. Coffee, Jr., Due Process for Kaye, Scholer, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 16, 1992,
at 22 (surveying the due process issues raised by freeze orders); Marvin E. Frankel,
Lawyers Can't Be Stool Pigeons, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1992, at A25 (referring to the asset
freeze as a "Draconian" exercise of the government's preattachment power).
36Stephen Labaton, Law Firm Will Pay a $41 Million Fine in Savings Lawsuit, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 1992, at Al. The firm had already paid $20 million in settle securities
and racketeering lawsuits brought against it by investors who had purchased bonds
from Lincoln's parent company. Stephen Labaton, US. Moves to Freeze Assets of Law
Firm for S&L Role, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1992, at Al, D8.
3'See FIRREA Expands Civil Enforcement Powers of Regulators, Increases Penalties Allowed,
53 Banking Rep. (BNA) 424 (Sept. 25, 1989).
3In its Notice of Charges, the OTS went to great lengths to show that Kaye Scholer
attorneys acted as agents for Lincoln and participated in defining the course of con-
duct of Lincoln. See, e.g., Notice of Charges, supra note 31, at 8.
39Most recently, an attorney of Silver, Freeman & Taff in Washington, D.C. agreed
to pay $600,000 to settle an OTS administrative action which charged that he was
a person who had "participated in the conduct of the affairs of Lincoln" and rendered
an improper legal opinion. See Steve France, Nightmare For Bank Lawyers, NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 21, 1992, at 13, 14 (noting that the attorney's role was limited to rendering an
opinion on a transaction that had already been structured by other law firms).
4°See John K. Villa, Bank and Thrift Lawyers are Targets for Agency Actions, BANKING
POL'Y REP., June 17, 1991, at 3-4 (noting that the consent orders agreed to by ac-
counting firms did not address the crucial question of administrative sanction for
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III. FIDUCIARY LIABILITY
Although the thrust of the OTS action against Kaye Scholer was that
the-firm violated regulations, the OTS also asserted a new theory of liability.
The OYTS pleading stated that the Kaye Scholer attorneys failed to inform
the directors of the directors' "fiduciary duties to the depositors and to
the federal insurance fund."'4 The Notice of Charges against the Kaye
Scholer attorneys made two references to the attorneys' failure to advise
the directors of their fiduciary duties.
42
The OTS allegations against Kaye Scholer should come as no surprise
to bank counsel, given OTS Chief Counsel Weinstein's public statements.
As early as 1990, Weinstein declared that bank fiduciaries owe a duty to
depositors and the depository fund. 43 Weinstein asserted that financial in-
stitution directors owe a duty to the government which springs from two
sources: (1) the notion that the government should be treated as a creditor
in an imminent insolvency situation, and (2) the view that the government
is a "holder of the potentially unlimited negative equity risk.' '4 In a speech
at Southern Methodist University ("the SMU speech"), Weinstein
elaborated on these theories by noting that the government is owed strict
fiduciary duties as subrogee of the depositors.
4 5
A. Directors' Duty to Creditors
In the SMU speech, Weinstein adverted to the "Hornbook principle
that a debtor who is insolvent or nearly so owes a fiduciary duty to
pre-FIRREA conduct). The issue was recently raised in a Petition for an Order to
Show Cause and for Summary Enforcement of an Administrative Subpoena filed in
OTS v. Ernst & Young, No. 91-401 (D.D.C. 1991). The U.S. District Judge issued an
order enforcing the subpoena, rejecting Ernst & Young's argument that under pre-
FIRREA law, accountants were not "persons participating" in the affairs of an in-
stitution. Memorandum Opinion and Order in OTS v. Ernst & Young, 786 F. Supp.
46, 53 (D.D.C. 1992).
'Notice of Charges, supra note 31, at 79.
42Notie of Charges, supra note 31, at 26, 79.
43See Bank, Thrft Attorneys React to Duties Outlined by 0TS Chief Counsel Weinstein, 55
Banking Rep. (BNA) 547 (Oct. 1, 1990) (hereinafter Attorneys React].
44Thomas C. Rice & Blake A. Bell, Liability of Lender's Counsel, in LENDER LIABILI-
TY AND OTHER COMPLEX LrrATION INVOLVING FINANCIAL INSTrTuTIONS, C665 ALl-
ABA at 271, 277 (1991).
45Speech By Th Chief Counsel Weinstein On Duties Of Depository Institution Fiduciaries, 55
Banking Rep. (BNA) 510, 511 (Sept. 24, 1990) [hereinafter Text of SMU Speech].
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creditors." 46 He also noted the well-established rule that a trustee for a
bankrupt estate owes a fiduciary duty to the estate's creditors, and that
a breach of such duty can lead to personal liability.
47
Applying these principles to an insolvent thrift institution or to one
"close to the line," Weinstein maintained that the government is essential-
ly a creditor of an insolvent institution. 4 As fiduciaries of a bankrupt estate
are concerned primarily with the interest of creditors, Weinstein argued
that the fiduciaries of an institution that is insolvent, or nearly so, should
be concerned primarily with the interest of the United States Government
as the institution's largest creditor.4 9 Based on this analysis, Weinstein
reached the following conclusion:
The closer an institution is to solvency [sic], the more paramount does
the duty to the government become. The duties that, in a solvent, unin-
sured, continuing enterprise might be owed only to the common
shareholders, are now owed to the creditors, and the fiduciaries are charged
with the duty to avoid losses to the creditors.50
Therefore, Weinstein asserted that fiduciaries of financial institutions should
not be free to gamble away the remaining assets of an institution sinking
into insolvency. Weinstein argued that directors must understand that the
government, as the true party in interest, is owed a fiduciary duty.5
In analyzing this theory, the starting point is to determine if and when,
depositors as creditors, are owed fiduciary duties. Prior to insolvency, cor-
porate directors are the fiduciaries of the corporation and its shareholders.
5 2
Generally speaking, prior to insolvency the directors owe no fiduciary duties
to the corporation's creditors.5 3
46Id.
471d. (citing In re Consupak, Inc., 87 B.R. 529, 546 (Bankr. N.D. InI. 1988); In re
Gorski 766 F2d 723, 727 (2d Cir. 1985); Red Carpet Corp. of Panama City Beach v.
Miller, 708 F.2d 1576, 1578 (11th Cir. 1983).
48Text of SMU Speech, supra note 45, at 511.
49Text of SMU Speech, supra note 45, at 511.
50Text of SMU Speech, supra note 45, at 511.
5t Text of SMU Speech, supra note 45, at 512. According to Weinstein, counsel has
a duty to advise the corporate fiduciary of this duty. Counsel who fails to do so breaches
a duty to the institution-client. Remarks of Harris Weinstein Delivered at the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School, March 24, 1992 at 19.
52DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESSJUDGEMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES
OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 1 (3d ed. & Supp. 1991).
53See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504,
1524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (declining to recognize that a fiduciary duty was owed to bond
holders who were unsecured creditors of the corporation). See also Gardner & Florence
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Insolvency transforms this relationship by shifting the fiduciary duty
of the directors from the shareholders to the creditors.5 4 Thus, directors
of insolvent corporations can be personally liable in an action brought by
creditors, or in an action by a trustee in bankruptcy on behalf of the cor-
poration or all creditors as a group.5 As stated in FDIC v. Sea Pines Co. ,56
"[t]he law by the great weight of authority seems to be settled that when
a corporation becomes insolvent, or in a failing condition, the officers and
directors no longer represent the stocholders, but by the fact of insolvency become
trustees for the creditors... ."s5 Corporate officers and directors of an in-
solvent corporation are in a sense trustees "holding the corporate proper-
ty for the benefit of all creditors."
58
The court in Sea Pines stated that the duty of directors and officers shifts
when the corporation reaches "a failing condition."' 59 The court did not
provide any further guidance on the meaning of the phrase, "in a failing
condition."
Determining when a company's financial condition is sufficient to shift
the director's duties from shareholders to creditors may be difficult to
Call Cowles Found. v. Empire Inc., 589 F. Supp. 669, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (noting that
fiduciary duties in a debenture contract do not exist in the abstract, but are derived
from the indenture itself), vacated on jurisditina grounds, 754 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1985).
5See In re STN Enters., 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1985) (criticizing the lower court
for not recognizing that creditors of an insolvent corporation are owed fiduciary duties).
"Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Duties of Directors of Distressed Corporations,
204 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 8, 1990, at 5, 6. See also Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., E3forcemnent of Mznage-
ment's Duties to Corporate Creditors, 6 AM. Bus. L.J. 371, 372-78 (1968) (discussing types
of creditors' suits).
5.6692 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. dendi, 461 U.S. 928 (1983).
571d. at 977 (quoting Davis v. Woolf, 147 F.2d 629, 633 (4th Cir. 1945) (quoting
Arnold v. Knapp, 84 S.E. 895, 899 (W. Va. 1915))) (emphasis added).
58Id. at 977 (quoting Davis v. Woolf, 147 F2d 629, 633). See also WILLIAM E. KNEa-
PER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIREC-MRS § 7.03, at 171 (3d ed. 1978)
(noting recent litigation which has rejuvenated the trust fund doctrine, that requires
the directors of an insolvent corporation to conserve and apply corporate property
as trustee for all creditors and stockholders). For a jurisprudential analysis of the "trust
fund" doctrine, see Joseph Jude Norton, Relationship of Shareholders to Corporate Creditors
upon Dissolution: Nature and Implations of the "Trust Fund" Doctrine to Gorporate Assets, 30 Bus.
LAw. 1061 (1975).
59"The case law does not answer the question as to whether directors of an insol-
vent corporation owe fiduciary duties to shareholders, as well as creditors. For a discus-
sion of this question and other questions related to the fiduciary duties of directors
of distressed corporations, see Dennis J. Block, In the Lion's Mouth, University of Texas
14th Annual Conference on Securities Regulation and Business Law Problems, March
12, 1992, at 12-27.
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determine. 60 Insolvency is a slippery term which is defined differently in
various contexts. A corporation is considered insolvent when it is unable
"to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of business.''
6 1
For the purposes of appointing a receiver or conservator for a state depository
institution and a federal savings association, an entity is considered insol-
vent when its assets "are less than its obligations to its creditors and others,
including its members." 62 Although definitions of insolvency can te ap-
plied to an institution's balance sheet, some assets require valuation. 63 For
example, should loans of a financial institution be valued at their current
market value? Clearly, loans sold on a "fire sale" basis are deeply discounted
and do not reflect their actual value. This illustrates that a factual deter-
mination of an institution's insolvency depends on the valuation method.
Therefore, it may be very difficult for directors to objectively discern when
an institution is approaching insolvency and when its duties to creditors arise.
Recognizing the difficulty in determining when directors' duties shift
from shareholders to creditors, other government regulators have declined
to endorse Weinstein's theory that a duty is owed to the government as
an institution slides into insolvency. When asked to comment on Weinstein's
theory, FDIC General Counsel Al Byrne said that he was puzzled by the
notion of drawing "bright lines on approaching insolvency or imminent
failure [that would] convert the legal [duties] of an individual from that
of an independent advisor to that of a fiduciary." 64 Apparently, Byrne in-
terpreted Weinstein's comments as suggesting that the duty to creditors
was owed by the attorney, rather than the directors. In recent speeches,
6 0
WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
AND DIRECTORS § 5.08 (4th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1991).
61Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act § 6.40(c)(1) (1991) (prohibiting distributions to
shareholders by insolvent corporations). The common definition of insolvency, when
applied to a bank is as follows: capital stock and assets are insufficient to meet liabilities.
3 MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING, ch. 6 § 58, at 178-79 (1974). For national banks,
the Comptroller of the Currency has broad discretion to determine whether a national
bank is insolvent. Liberty Nat'l Bank of S.C. v. McIntosh, 16 F.2d 906, 908 (4th Cir.
1927), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 783 (1927). As stated by one commentator, the rule on in-
solvency "is not whether the [b]ank is insolvent, but whether the Comptroller [of the
Currency] is satisfied that it is insolvent." Frank L. Skillern, Closing and Liquidation of
Banks in Texas, 26 Sw. L.J. 830, 831, & n.8 (1972).
6212 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 11 1990).
63,e MICHIE, supra note 61, at 180 (noting that insolvency of a going concern is
a question of fact).
64See FDIC General Counsel Dedines to Embrace Higher Duty for Fiduciaries in Failing Banks,
55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 941, 942 (Dec. 10, 1990) (reporting on the remarks of Al Byrne).
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Weinstein has attempted to clarify his belief that the attorney's duty is to
advise the directors on the directors' duties to creditors.
65
Although imminent failure may not convert the legal position of out-
side legal counsel, Sea Pines lends support to Weinstein's argument that the
officers' and directors' duties to creditors arise when their institution ap-
proaches insolvency. This duty to creditors would flow to depositors who
normally are viewed as creditors. Once an institution fails and the govern-
ment makes payment to depositors, the government stands in the shoes of
the depositors, and arguably becomes a creditor of the institution. 66 As a
creditor, the government might question various activities of the directors,
claiming that directors knew that the institution was approaching insolvency
and that the directors breached their fiduciary duties to creditors by gambling
the institution's remaining assets. At the same time, the government could
challenge such activities as violative of the statutory provisions prohibiting
unsafe and unsound practices.
67
B. Directors' Duty to "Negative Equity Holders"
Weinstein has also stated that attorneys must apprise directors of the
directors' obligation to consider the potential risk of loss to the "owners"
of the corporate entity.68 He has asserted that the owners of a corporate
entity insured by the government consist of two constituencies: (1) the positive
equity holders who are common shareholders and (2) the "negative equity
holders" who have assumed risk by issuing a charter and insuring the
deposits of the entity.6 9 Weinstein stated that, by virtue of insurance and
this "negative equity risk," the government has assumed an equity posi-
tion with unlimited risk of loss and no prospect of gain. 70 Weinstein has
65 &w Speech by OTS Chief Counsel Weinstein on Duties of Depositary Institution Fiduciaris,
55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 508 (Sept. 24, 1990).
66The position of the FDIC as a creditor would be in addition to the position of
the FDIC as receiver.
67&e Lawrence G. Baxter, Fiduciary Issue in Federal Banking Regultion, 56 LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROBS. I (forthcoming 1992) for a critical analysis of the fiduciary duty
to the federal insurer. Professor Baxter concludes that recognition of such a fiduciary
duty adds nothing to the substance of the regulatory scheme which already prohibits
unsafe and unsound practices. Nevertheless, Professor Baxter points out that the
recognition of such a duty would have practical enforcement advantages for the
regulators. Id. at 39.
68 Text of SMU Speech, supra note 45, at 510.
69Txt of SMU Speech, supra note 45, at 511.
"0 Text of SMU Speech, supra note 45, at 511.
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also asserted that this equity position warrants the "highest conceivable
standard of fiduciary conduct."71
In connection with this duty owed to the government, Weinstein noted
that corporate fiduciaries owe duties to those who provide the equity with
which the institution operates. 7 2 Weinstein has not, however, cited any ac-
tual authority in support of his proposition that the federal government,
as an insurer or chartering agency, assumes some equity position. 
3
In dissecting the "negative equity holder" theory, it is necessary to
define the terms used and to consider basic principles of corporate finance.
Generally, a corporation's capitalization consists of equity, and often debt. 74
Persons who provide debt financing receive a debt instrument evidencing
the amount of interest and principal that must be repaid by the borrower.
7 5
Traditionally, such holders of debt instruments were not viewed as having
any ownership interest and, in the case of a solvent corporation, were not
owed any fiduciary duties by directors.
7 6
Weinstein blurs this distinction between shareholder-equity holders and
debt holders by characterizing the depositor-creditors and the government
as "negative equity holders." As such, he suggests that depositors and the
government are new classes of owners to whom fiduciary duties are owed.
Weinstein's use of "negative equity" is a departure from the term's
normal usage. "Negative equity" commonly describes an enterprise's finan-
cial position. 77 In the corporate context, for example, negative equity might
be reflected on the corporate balance sheet when the stockholders have
71Text of SMU Speech, supra note 45, at 511.
72Text of SMU Speech, supra note 45, at 511.
73The logical extension of this theory is that other govenrment agencies hold a
"negative equity" position. For example, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
and state insurance departments that operate guaranty funds would be considered
"negative equity holders."
74
LARRY D. SODERQUIST & A.A. SOMMER, JR., UNDERSTANDING CORPORATION
LAW 89 (1990).
75This classic distinction between debt and equity does not apply to innovative
financing techniques and instruments. See CECIL WRAY, JR. & SUZANNE VEILLEUX,
INNOVATIVE CORPORATE FINANCING TECHNIQUES (BNA Corp. Practice Series No. 48,
1986) (for a detailed analysis of various financial instruments that have features of both
debt and equity financing).
76Text of SMU Speech, supra note 45, at 511.
77For example, in the context of a savings and loan association, one commentator
noted that in 1981, 450 savings and loans were technically insolvent in that they had
a negative equity position. Russell W. King, Comment, The FSLIC and Subject Matter
Jurisdiction: Is a Court Really Necessary, 20 TEx. TECH L. REv. 155, 158 n.26 (1989).
ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW / 1993
withdrawn from the corporation more than they have invested or when the
corporation's losses exceed the shareholders' equity contribution.
78
Weinstein does not concede that the duty to depositors must await the
presence of a "negative equity" position. Instead, he insists that the directors
of even a solvent stock corporation owe duties to depositors (as well as
shareholders), because depositors also add significantly to the institution's
operating funds. 7 9 By analogy, the depositors are similar to equity holders.
8 0
In that regard, Weinstein maintains that the depositors, as well as the govern-
ment as insurer of the deposits, are owed fiduciary duties prior to insolvency.
Weinstein's argument ignores the legal obstacles to imposing such a
fiduciary duty on directors. First, the argument conflicts with existing prece-
dent which refuses to extend a fiduciary duty to creditors, such as debenture
holders. 81 Among other reasons, courts believe that creditors can contractually
protect their interests by incorporating provisions in the debt instrument 
8 2
Second, and more fundamentally, the imposition of a fiduciary duty
on directors creates what may be an irreconcilable conflict of interest. The
interests of the shareholders and the debt holders often diverge.
83 When
78See, e.g. Polaris Indus. Corp. v. Kaplan, 747 P.2d 884, 885 (Nev. 1987) (noting
that the corporate balance sheet reflected a negative equity position).
79 Text of SMU Speech, supra note 45, at 511.
8 0Using Weinstein's analysis, large creditors in highly leveraged corporations could
qualify as "negative equity holders." Similarly, insurers of bond offerings could be
considered "negative equity holders."
8le Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 1988) (holding that no fiduciary
duties were owed to debenture holders). "Before a fiduciary duty arises, an existing
property right or equitable interest supporting such a duty must exist." Id.
82JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANK-
ING 290 (forthcoming 1992) (suggesting that the government, in its role as banking
regulator, protect itself by contract). Query whether the government could follow the
lead of insurance companies that use contractual provisions to define the duties and
obligations of the insured to the insurer. The government could expand its use of regula-
tions to spell out the duties and obligations of the insured institituion and its direc-
tors. See Fischer Black et al., An Approach to the Regulation of Bank Holing Companies, 51
J. Bus. 379, 385-87 (1978) (arguing that efficient government supervision should
resemble the measures adopted by private lenders, imposing controls on borrowers).
The OTS has already taken steps in this direction. For example, on November 19,
1991, the OTS issued a regulatory bulletin stating it would bar thrifts with the lowest
financial condition ratings (MACRO 4 and 5), from "entering into contracts outside
the normal course of business unless they obtain prior approval [from] the CTS regional
directors." See OTS Restricts Third Party S&L Contracts, Says Macro 4 and 5 Thrifts Need Ap-
proval, 57 Banking Rep. (BNA) 893 (Dec. 2, 1991) (quoting an OTS spokesman who
stated that the new policy was designed to prevent troubled thrifts from wasting assets).
83Depending on the degree of risk, the shareholders' and depositors' interests may
converge. Both shareholders and depositors want directors to avoid making patently
unwise investments. Under Weinstein's theory, both shareholders and creditors could
bring actions against directors for such investments. After an institution fails, the FDIC
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called upon to make business decisions, corporate directors may be torn be-
tween protecting the interests of debt holders, who prefer low risk, and
enhancing the interests of shareholders, who stand to gain by way of a higher
level of risk. 84 In a solvent corporation, a director who elevates "creditor-
depositor" interests above those of shareholders might be inviting the share-
holders to sue the directors for negligence and breach of their fiduciary duties.
As a financial institution approaches insolvency, the potential conflict be-
tween the shareholders and creditors becomes more acute. At that point,
the shareholders might prefer that directors "bet the bank." Creditors, by
contrast, would almost certainly prefer conservation of the remaining assets.
Another flaw in Weinstein's argument is that it implies that the courts
have uniformly recognized that directors owe depositors a fiduciary duty.
In reality, the courts are split. While some courts have referred to a fiduciary
duty to depositors, 85 the vast majority ofjudicial opinions refuse to recognize
such a duty.8 6 Similarly, commentators have expressed different views on
the extent to which directors owe fiduciary duties to depositors.8 7
pays depositors. At that point, the FDIC, standing in the shoes of the depositors, could
sue. If the shareholders have claims, circuit courts reach opposite conclusions on the
issue of whether the shareholders must stay their action until the FDIC has litigated
or settled its claims. SeeJames P. Murphy, Standards Governing Conduct of Officers, Directors,
and Others, in CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS, DIRECTORS AND PROFES-
SIONALS: BANK AND THRIFT LITIGATION IN THE 1990s, at 115, 122 (PLI Commercial
Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 565, 1991).
84For a thorough discussion of this conflict between shareholders and debtors in a
financial institution context, see Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective
on Bank Regulation in a Deregulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 501, 541-47 (1989).
"See, e.g., Lane v. Chowning, 610 F.2d 1385, 1388-89 (8th Cir. 1979) (stating that
it is "well settled" that the fiduciary duty of a bank officer or director is owed to the
depositors and the shareholders); Missouri v. State Bank of Hallsville, 561 S.W.2d 722,
724 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (stating that directors serve as agents of the depositors, as
well as the shareholders and the corporation). See also Garner v. Pearson, 545 F. Supp.
549, 556-57 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (holding that control persons of a bank had a duty to
depositors), affd, 732 F.2d 850 (11th Cir. 1984).
86These cases which deny the existence of a fidicuary relationship characterize
depositors as creditors of the institution. See, e.g., Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99,
101 (1966); United States v. Bank of Celina, 721 E2d 163, 167 (6th Cir. 1983) (under
Tennessee law); Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Control Metals Corp., 566 F.2d 631, 637
(9th Cir. 1977) (under California law); Jensen v. State Bank of Allison, 518 F.2d 1, 5 (8th
Cir. 1975) (under Iowa law); First Nat'l Bank of Clinton v. Julian, 383 F.2d 329, 338 (8th
Cir. 1967) (under Missouri law); Sec. Pac. Int'l Bank v. Nat'l Bank of W Pa., 772 F Supp.
874, 877 (W.D. Pa. 1991) (under Pennsylvania law); Texas Commerce Bank-Hurst, N.A.
v. United States, 703 F Supp. 592, 594 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (under Texas law); Phillips &
Jacobs, Inc. v. Color-Art, Inc., 553 F Supp. 14, 16 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (under Georgia law).
7 0ne author has gone so far as to refer to directors as trustees of depositors. See
EDGAR G. ALCORN, THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF BANK DIRECTORS 27 (1980).
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In an attempt to reconcile these conflicting cases, one treatise suggests
that the parties' intentions in entering the deposit contract should control.8 8
An analysis of the conflicting case law indicates that some courts have con-
sidered the parties intentions, finding that a fiduciary relationship exists
when:
(1) the customer has reposed trust and confidence in the bank; and
(2) the bank has invited or accepted such trust and confidence.8 9
This analysis, however, fails to explain why some courts find that a fiduciary
duty is owed to all depositors while other courts deny the existence of such
a duty.
C. Implications for Counsel
Given the lack of consensus on the extent to which directors owe
fiduciary duties to depositors, what is counsel's role in advising institu-
tional directors? Until such time as there is clarification on the scope of
directors' duties to depositors, counsel must advise directors of the govern-
ment's position and the applicable state and federal laws.
What are the practical consequences of counsel advising directors that
their activities may be considered a breach of their duties to depositors?
Certainly, counsel's communication to the directors charges them with
notice. Consequently, by merely suggesting these theories, the government
Other commentators have stated that directors will not be liable to depositors for
mismanagement or negligence in the absence of fraud or willful misconduct. JOSEPH
J. NORTON & SHERRY CASTLE WHITLEY, BANKING LAW MANUAL: LEGAL GUIDE TO
COMMERCIAL BANKS, THRIFT INSTITUTIONS, CREDIT UNIONS S 6.05, 6-38 (Supp.
1988). Another view is that in order for directors to be personally liable, directors must
intentionally commit a wrongful act that directly injures the depositors or creditors.
WILLIAM H. SCHLICHTING, ET AL., BANKING LAW SS 6.10, 6.57 (Supp. 1992).
98"The circumstances of various bank customer relations range from the elderly
widow relying on the bank for a broad spectrum of financial advice to the publicly
traded corporation with only a deposit." EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR. &JAMESJ. WHITE,
BANKING LAw 285 (2d ed. 1984).
89Kenneth W. Curtis, The Fiduciary Controversy: Injection of Fiduciary Principes into the
Bank Depositor and Bank-Borrower Reationsh'ps, 20 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 795, 799 (1987).
Decisions of the California Courts of Appeals illustrate the confusion surrounding this
issue. In 1985, the California Court of Appeals (Fourth District) found that the bank-
depositor relationship was "at least quasi-fiduciary." Commercial Cotton Co. v. United
Cal. Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 516 (1985). Then in 1988, the same court changed
its position, rejecting its earlier characterization of the relationship as "quasi-fiduciary."
Copesky v. Superior Court for San Diego, 229 Cal. App. 3d 678, 693 (1991).
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has effectively made the institution's lawyer the mouthpiece of the govern-
ment. As illustrated by the following scenarios, this enhances the govern-
ment's ability to affect the directors' decision-making processes and to
recover from directors or their attorneys.
Under the first scenario, counsel advises the directors of the govern-
ment's position. If directors heed the warning, and only make conservative
choices, the "government message" has influenced the decision-making
of the directors.
In the second scenario, the attorney goes through the counseling exer-
cise, advising the directors on the government's position. As noted above,
counsel's warning puts the directors on notice. Prior to this notice, the direc-
tors may be sued for common law negligence or breach of fiduciary duty. 90
After this notice, however, directors may be exposed to liability under
FIRREA and other banking legislation which requires more than
negligence. 91 Warnings from regulators, or others, heighten a director's
standard of care. 92 Therefore, counsel's warning may convert the claim
against the directors from an ordinary negligence claim to a gross negligence
claim.93 Once sued, a director may be deprived of a defense based on either
reliance on counsel or exercise of business judgment. 94
A third possibility is the scenario where counsel fails to advise the direc-
tors of the government's position. In that event, the directors who are later
pursued by the government might then sue counsel for negligently failing
900n Feb. 24, 1992, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that
the FDIC can sue bank officers and directors for ordinary negligence. The court found
that FIRREA did not limit the FDIC to gross negligence claims in suits against direc-
tors. FDIC v. Canfield, No. 91-4143 (10th Cir. Feb. 24, 1992) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
U.S. App. file). For discussion of the case, see FDIC Wins on Appeal in D&O Litigation
as Ordinary Negligence Claims Stand Up, 58 Banking Rep. (BNA) 419 (Mar. 9, 1992).
91For example, under U.S.C. § 93 (1988), a national bank director is personally
liable for damages sustained as a consequence of "knowing" violations.
92Brickner v. FDIC, 747 F.2d 1198, 1202 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting that directors should
have taken additional precautions after regulators' warnings).
9SA director or officer may be held personally liable for damages due to gross
negligence and intentional tortious conduct. The elements of gross negligence and tor-
tious conduct will be defined by applicable state law. In addition, higher civil penalities
can be assessed against the director upon demonstration of certain types of culpabil-
ity, such as recklessness or knowing violations. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (i)(2) (Supp.
11 1990) (setting forth the graduated penalties for institution-affiliated parties).
94Under the business judgment rule, the plaintiff must plead and prove facts suf-
ficient to overcome the presumption that the directors acted with due care. Stephen
A. Radin, The Director's Duty of Care Three Years After Smith v. Van Gorkom, 39 HASTINGS
L.J. 707, 714 (1988).
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to advise. In addition, the government, standing in the shoes of the institu-
tion, could claim that counsel breached his or her duty to the corporation
by failing to competently advise the directors.
The government improves its position in all of the cited scenarios.
Because lawsuits are seldom large enough to compensate for losses, the
government would prefer the first scenario. Under the first scenario, the
government's message is followed by directors who avoid risky ventures
and possible receivership. In this regard, the regulators are acting as "super-
managers" in influencing the management's risk taking.
95
The government's policy statements create a dilemma for counsel
representing financial institutions. Counsel may criticize one or more of
the government's theories. Still, in an effort to be diligent, counsel may
communicate the theories to the directors.
In order for counsel to establish that he or she warned the officers and
directors, counsel may document the communication. If the lawyer does,
the government could use the writing as a trial exhibit when suing the direc-
tors. Failure to document the advice impairs counsel's ability to defend
a legal malpractice case. Therefore, a prudent lawyer often documents ad-
vice. Such documentation would protect the lawyer and incriminate the
directors. As a consequence, bank counsel has been co-opted into being
an arm of the regulators. 96 This may have a chilling effect, causing attorneys
and directors to err on the side of excessive caution, perhaps to the detri-
ment of the industry.
9 7
95As described by Helen Garten, the new regulation that focuses on risk taking
puts the regulator into the position of "supermanager" who can impose direct discipline
on the business decisions of management. See Garten, supra note 84, at 546.
96As characterized by one commentator, the government is attempting to recruit
"policemen" in the form of attorneys and accountants. Lawrence G. Baxter, judicial
Responses to the f/ecent Enforcement Activities of the Federal Banking Regulators, 59 FORDHAM L.
REV. 193, 238 (1991).
971d. See also Sidney S. Rosdeitcher, The Thrift Crisis and Lawyer's Liability, in ClvIL
AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, AND PROFESSIONALS: BANK AND
THRIFT LITIGATION IN THE 1990s, at 409, 431-32 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 565, 1991) (noting that the government's enforcement
activity may transform the independent bar into a group of timid, obstructive lawyers
who are ready to abandon or turn in their clients at any hint of wrongdoing and who
are primarily concerned with protecting themselves).
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IV. EXPERIENCE OF THE SECURITIES AND BANKING BARS
The OTS's efforts to convert counsel into government agents remind
some lawyers of the SEC's efforts in the 1970s.
Beginning in the 1970s, the General Counsel and Enforcement Divi-
sion of the SEC started scrutinizing the conduct of attorneys. 98 In 1972,
the SEC brought its most significant and celebrated injunctive action against
attorneys. In SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.,99 the SEC alleged that
the law firm aided and abetted the client in securities law violations. Still,
what is significant about the case is that the SEC did not condemn the
law firm for actually participating in the wrongdoing, but rather for fail-
ing to take action to prevent the client's misconduct. 0 0
This case captured the attention of the securities bar, causing the at-
torneys to re-evaluate their own duties and corresponding liabilities.
Although much of the initial focus related to lawyers' civil and criminal
exposure, the focus broadened to include fundamental questions relating
to the attorney-client relationship. 01 As stated by the court in National Stu-
dent Marketing:
The filing of the complaint in this proceeding generated significant in-
terest and an almost overwhelming amount of comment within the legal
profession on the scope of a securities lawyer's obligations... to the in-
vesting public. The very initiation of this action, therefore, has provided
a necessary and worthwhile impetus for the profession's recognition and
assessment of its responsibilities in this area. 0
2
The SEC complaint emphasized the view that securities attorneys have
responsibilities to the investing public.10 3 SEC Commissioners have reiterated
98Prior to 1971, the SEC had taken no action against major law firms. Richard
H. Rowe, The SEC Moves Cautiously on Lawyer Accountability, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 13, 1979,
at 35.
99Securities Exch. Comm'n v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682
(D.D.C. 1978).
'00 d. See also Kenneth F. Krach, The Client-Fraud Dilemma: A Need for Consensus, 46
MD. L. REV. 436, 460-61 n. 147 (1987) (citing the National Student Marketing com-
plaint which alleged that the corporation's attorneys failed to insist that the shareholders
be resolicited and failed to notify the SEC concerning the misleading nature of the
corporation's financial statements).
' 0'See ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 312 (2d
ed. 1984) (noting that there was a flood of commentary following Naitonal Marketing).
102457 F. Supp. at 714 (footnote omitted).
'
0 3 KAUFMAN, supra note 101, at 313
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this message, delivering speeches on attorneys' professional responsibility. 104
In a published speech, Commissioner A.A. Sommer asserted that securities
attorneys were gatekeepers, holding the pass keys to securities transactions. 1
05
In this role, securities attorneys must function more like auditors than
advocates. l
06
The ABA issued a policy statement to address these questions ("Policy
Statement").17 In its Policy Statement, the ABA strongly rejected the SEC's
position and reaffirmed the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship. 08
In 1979, the SEC riveted the securities bar by bringing an administra-
tive action against two attorneys from the well-known Wall Street law firm
of Brown, Wood, Ivey, Mitchell & Perry.10 9 The SEC brought this disci-
plinary action, In re Carter andJohnson,10 ("CarterJohnson") under Rule 2(e)
of the Rules of Practice of the SEC."'1 Noting that the SEC had never
'"Commissioner Roberta Karmel did not share the views of the other Commis-
sioners. She frequently criticized the position that the securities bar owed the investing
public certain duties of care and disclosure. SeJoseph C. Daley & Roberta S. Karmel,
Attorneys' Responsibilities: Adversaries at the Bar of the SEC, 24 EMORY L.J. 747 (1975). After
leaving the SEC, Karmel continued to question the SEC's theories of liability. Se,
e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Duty to the Target: Is an Attorney's Duty to the Corporation a Paraeigm
fir Directorn?, 39 HASrINGS L.J. 677 (1988).
iosSee A.A. Sommer, Jr., The Emerging Responsibiies of the Secunrts Lawyer [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,631 (1974) (referring to the new focus
upon the role of attorney as the keeper of the stop and go signal).
'06Commissioner Sommer admitted, however, that the implications of this role
raised many questions as to how attorneys should represent clients. Id.
107Sakn of Poliky Adopted by American Bar Association Regardi g ResponsilUis and Liablies
of Lawyers in Advising with Repect to the Complia e by C&nts with Laws Adinistered by th
Securiti and Exchange Commission, Report to the House of Degate, Section of Corporation, Bank-
ing and Businms Law Recommendation, 31 Bus. LAw 543, 544 (1975) (Report to the House
of Delegates, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law Recommendation).
'08According to the ABA Policy Statement, attorney-client confidentiality en-
courages clients to consult legal counsel freely. Forcing attorneys to disclose confidences
to third parties, such as the SEC, would seriously impair the lawyer's ability to counsel
and defend clients. Id.
"9See Barry M. Hager, Karmd Out in Key CarterJohnson Disdpline Case, LEGAL TIMES,
July 30, 1979, at 1. Prior to Carter-Johnson, the SEC was slow to use its Rule 2(e)
authority to bring actions against attorneys from large firms.
"oSee State Deveopments: Regulatory Briefs, 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at
278 (Feb. 17, 1984).
"'Rule 2(e) of the SEC's Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1991), states:
"The Commission may deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing
or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the Commission after
notice of and opportunity for hearing in the matter (i) not to possess the requisite
qualifications to represent others, or (ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to
have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct, or (iii) to have willfully
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promulgated standards of professional responsibility, the respondents in
Carter-Johnson argued that it was fundamentally unfair to impose standards
retroactively. 112
In the aftermath of Carter-Johnson, law firms became more circumspect.
Securities attorneys continued to reassess their responsibilities. For exam-
ple, law firms scrutinized their due diligence procedures and opinion let-
ter policies. "1
3
The mere threat of government action intimidated securities lawyers.
This affected the manner in which lawyers represented clients. As described:
Law firms anxious to avoid an SEC prosecution began to err by placing
too much emphasis on their duty of candor to the government .... The
SEC's position intimidated attorneys, curtailed zealous representation of
clients, and interfered with the continuing development of the securities
laws.' 4
Once sued, law firms felt an extraordinary amount of pressure to settle." 5
The prospect of lengthy and expensive litigation, negative publicity, and
occasionally, civil and criminal contempt charges, intimidated law firms into
settlement. ",6 Perhaps the most insidious effect of the SEC's actions was the
subtle influence on attorneys' thought processes." 7 Under the circumstances,
attorneys' fear of liability conceivably colors their advice to clients." 8
There are numerous comparisons between the enforcement agenda of
the federal securities regulators and that of the banking regulators. Both
violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any provision of the Federal
securities laws ... or the rules and regulations thereunder."
"12SEC Release No. 34-17597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,847, 84,145, 84,164 (Feb. 28, 1981). The Commissioners agreed that it would
be unfair to establish new rules of conduct and to impose rules retroactively, on those
who acted "without reason to believe their conduct was unethical or improper." Id.
'"Although securities lawyers refined their practice and took steps to minimize
their liability, insurers regarded securities practice as a high risk specialty. This af-
fected both the availability and cost of malpractice insurance. See KAUFMAN, supra note
101, at 318 (attributing the enormous increase in malpractice premiums to the uncer-
tainties in securities practice).
" 4Krach, supra note 100, at 462 (footnote omitted).
"1'Krach, supra note 100, at 461-62.
116Krach, supra note 100, at 461-62.
1 "Richard H. Rowe, Potential Exposure to Governmental Action Under the Federal Securities
Laws for Rendering Legal Opinions, in OPINION LETTERS OF COUNSEL 1987, at 865, 944
(PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 583, 1987).
" 8 See id.
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groups emphasized counsel's gatekeeping role, taking the position that
counsel owes a duty to persons other than the immediate client. Both groups
of regulators made a big splash by filing actions against major firms.
Banking regulators have also followed the lead of the SEC Commis-
sioners who spoke and wrote on counsel's emerging duties. Harris Weins-
tein said that lawyers would be held to the "highest standards of the pro-
fession." 119 The SEC Commissioners referred to the "rigorous standards
of professional honor."' 120 Neither the SEC Commissioners nor Weinstein
described such standards.
The private bar's reaction to the public statements by Harris Weins-
tein has mirrored its earlier reactions to the SEC Commissioners'
statements. The Carter-Johnson attorneys challenged the retroactive applica-
tion of duties. Similarly, bank counsel now argue that retroactive applica-
tion is fundamentally unfair.
21
Banking attorneys, like their colleagues in the securities bar, are
scrutinizing their duties and re-evaluating their policies and procedures.
For example, banking attorneys are adopting policies prohibiting service
on the boards of directors and requiring specific engagement letters. Firms
are also instituting peer review procedures and are employing trained ethics
experts.1
22
Banking practice, like securities practice, is now perceived as a high
risk specialty. As a result, some malpractice insurers refuse to underwrite
banking attorneys. Other insurers are increasing premiums for banking
attorneys or are specifically excluding coverage for banking regulators'
claims.123
The bank regulators, like the securites regulators, have created a climate
of intimidation. The commentary on the Kaye Scholer action reflects this
perception. For example, in referring to the recent action against Kaye
119Harris Weinstein, Remarks at the Administrative Conference of the U.S. Col-
loquy on the Ethical Obligations of Attorneys Representing Depository Institutions
14 (Mar. 21, 1990).
1201n re Emanuel Fields, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,407 (June 18, 1973).
121&e Attorneys React, supra note 43, at 547-48 (quoting Ron Glancz, a partner at
Drinker, Biddle & Reath, who noted the constitutional obstacles presented by retroac-
tive application).
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OTS VS. THE BAR
Scholer, one critic stated that the government employed a "heavy-handed
tactic meant to bludgeon settlement."1 24 The subject law firms have also
expressed similar sentiments. 125 In their opinion, they were forced to settle
because of the exorbitant costs of prolonged litigation and the adverse ef-
fect of negative publicity.
V. RETHINKING THE ROLE OF COUNSEL
As a result of these settlements, the answers to the serious questions
raised by the government's actions remain muddled. 126 Apparently, litiga-
tion will not resolve these questions. As illustrated by recent settlements,
law firms cannot afford to fight the government's charges. The cases that
proceed to trial will inevitably result in endless appeals with fact-specific
results that have limited precedential value. Although the OTS's theories
of counsel liability have not been tested in court, the instigation of these
lawsuits has already affected the conduct of bank counsel, on both the firm
and the individual level, where the government's enforcement message
shadows attorney's actions and thought processes.
Given the uproar following the Kaye Scholer case, banking regulators
may be less inclined to bring enforcement actions based on untested theories.
Nevertheless, the real legacy of Kaye Scholer and other OTS actions is their
insidious influence on banking practice. Even assuming that the govern-
ment does not bring further actions alleging new theories, the government
has already scored a victory in forcing attorneys to reassess their role in
the changing legal landscape where attorneys are targets.
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avoid the millions of dollars and years of litigation needed to fight the charges). In
May 1991, Sherman & Howard also agreed to settle the FDIC's action brought in con-
nection with the firm's representation of Silverado. Judge Sherman Finesilver of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado approved the Sherman & Howard set-
tlement with the FDIC, stating that "[tJhe allegations in the complaint did in fact
present difficult and novel legal issues in a complex and changing legal environment.
The dynamics of this type of litigation are still unfolding and settlement dialogue
recognizes the uncertainties of results and inevitability of endless appeals." Neil Bush,
Other Silverado Board Member, and S&L's Law Firm Agree to Settle with FDIC, 56 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 1058 (June 3, 1991).
' 26Accountability by Sledgehammer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1992, at A24 (arguing that
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tions relating to the proper role of counsel).

